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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the performance of the German economy and the role of the regulation
and welfare state policies in affecting its performance. While the German economy is still strong,










I know from life and from history that … often, the outward and visible material 
signs and symbols of happiness and success only show themselves when the process of 
decline has set in. The outer manifestations take time like the light of the star up there, 
which may in reality be already quenched when it looks to be shining brightest 
(Thomas Buddenbrooks to his sister Tony in Buddenbrooks, Part 7, Chapter 6).   4
 
1. Introduction 
The German economy lacks the robustness and vitality it possessed in the Erhard era. It is 
still a strong economy, competitive in medium-high technology trade, but it could be 
stronger. Unemployment is high, employment growth is low, and its competitive position 
in world trade is weak in areas of high technology, such as computers, communication 
technology, and biotechnology. 
Germany’s poor competitive position in high technology is a symptom of two 
interrelated factors. First, weak incentives to invest in skill (human capital) and venture 
capital, produced by the current level of regulation, taxation and bureaucratization. 
Second, the inability of the German system to respond to change rapidly. The new 
economy of the twenty-first century is characterized by variability and the need for 
flexible responses. This variability creates opportunity, but only for those able to respond 
quickly and with efficiency. It creates a demand for highly skilled labor and venture 
capital to respond to the new opportunities. The social system in Germany impedes rapid 
responses and hence thwarts the German economy from making use of the opportunities 
created by the new economy. 
To understand the problems that beset the German economy and the possible solution 
to these problems, it is important to understand the causes of these problems more clearly 
and to distinguish the short-run from the long-run problems. In my view, it is the 
incentives in place that have long run consequences that are the most worrisome because 
they affect the way Germany will perform in the next generation. By the miracle of 
compound interest, large growth rates produce large wealth levels for future generations 
while low growth rates produce low wealth levels. Germans should be worried about 
these rates, although most political discussions focus only on the short run targets. 
      The  immediate  problem  facing  Germany and much of Europe is that of high 
unemployment rates. Thirty years ago, German unemployment rates were the envy of the 
world. They were one fifth of the U.S. unemployment rate, which was the same then as it 
is today. Thirty years later, German unemployment is roughly twice that of the U.S. rate.  
More generally, European unemployment has increased to extraordinarily high levels 
over the past 20 years. Something has changed and that something is not specific to   5
Germany, but is common to many countries in Europe. Understanding that common 
factor, or set of factors, is the topic of a lot of recent research in economics. Despite 
appearances to the contrary, there is more agreement among economists than might first 
meet the eye.  Contrary to public perception, professional economists who study 
European unemployment and the German economy agree on the basic forces underlying 
the high persistent unemployment in Germany and much of Europe.  
         There is a substantial body of empirical evidence pointing to the fact that incentives 
matter and that firms, individuals, and nations respond to them. Germans who remember 
the rigid incentives  of the former  East German economy do not have to be reminded  
that  weak incentives can stifle productivity, investment, and effort. Less dramatically, 
incentives in Western economies to collect unemployment or disability benefits have 
been shown to have substantial effects in inducing people not to work and to go into 
beneficiary status. All economists looking at the empirical evidence accept this and the 
further point that the work disincentive effects of these programs are large. Disincentives 
imposed on firms such as minimum wages, union-imposed wage floors, or entry 
regulations have substantial effects especially when the minimums are binding. Studies 
from France, Latin America and Puerto Rico, where minimum wages are often a 
substantial fraction of average wages, as they are in Germany, have shown substantial 
disemployment effects of wage floors. Yet in the public discussion of employment 
creation these disemployment effects are minimized or ignored entirely. 
Incentives motivate economic life. It is important to understand how the modern 
welfare state affects these incentives in order to understand why welfare states perform 
the way they do. 
When the American economy is compared to the German and other European 
economies, it is not hard to reach the conclusion that it is something about incentives in 
the welfare state that gives rise to the differential performance of these two types of 
economies. This chapter is about those incentives, how they affect economic 
performance, and how incentives might be changed to improve that performance.  I want 
to consider the economic consequences of these incentives in both the short and the long 
run. Elections are won on short-term performance, so politicians focus on short-run   6
problems. However, as a detached scholar, I want to direct attention to the long-run 
issues: Nations prosper or founder on their long-run performance. 
          I make four main points and present empirical evidence to back them up, using 
references listed at the end of the chapter. 
1.  The incentives in European and German welfare states distort resource allocation 
and impair efficiency. The best estimates of the welfare cost of government activity—
what economists call deadweight burden—is 40 pfennigs for each mark raised by 
government activity, and some would place the cost even  higher. These costs arise from 
the distortions in economic activity induced by the fiscal system. Much more than the 
direct cost of taxation is involved.  
Centralized bargaining and regulation of business entry, banking practices, and 
employment all contribute to the burden. The levels of these disincentives are higher in 
Europe than in America, and this contributes to higher unemployment, lower 
employment growth, and a lower level of effort in the society. Such disincentive effects 
are much discussed in academic circles but they seem never to make their way into 
popular discussions of policy issues.  
The benefit of the current system is alleged to be the universal social insurance it 
provides. According to this argument, the efficiency cost of taxation and regulation is to 
be set against the benefit of greater equity and security (Agell, 1999). A closer look at 
how the system works in Germany and many other European countries shows that it 
produces security and even wage gains for protected insiders at the cost of inequity, job 
loss, and income losses for outsiders who are only partially protected by social insurance. 
Far from promoting social justice at the price of efficiency, it provides security  for some 
at the cost of exclusion for others. 
2.  The inefficiency and distortions created by the modern welfare state cannot 
explain the growth in European and German unemployment over the past 20 years. The 
edifice of the welfare state was in place 30 years ago, and arguably the incentives then 
were less favorable employment at that time than they are now (Ljungquist and Sargent, 
1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).  A vast empirical literature over the past 25 years 
has documented the distortions created by the welfare state. Many European governments 
reduced the worst of those incentive features in response to this literature but typically   7
only by modest amounts.  The reforms in Europe and Germany only partly close the 
incentive gap with America. 
What is it then that accounts for the rise in European unemployment? This is the 
second major topic of this chapter. A growing body of evidence points to the fact that the 
world economy is more variable and less predictable today than it was 30 years ago when 
the modern European welfare state with its high levels of taxation and regulation was 
established. This variability is associated with the entry of many countries into world 
trade; with the creation of new financial markets and markets for goods; and with the 
explosion in technology, especially in computers, information technology, and 
biotechnology. This variability is associated with the onset of skill-biased technical 
change proceeding at an uneven and unpredictable pace that is still transforming the 
workplace and making traditional methods of production and management obsolete. 
Many empirical studies have shown that skill-biased technology is at work in advanced 
countries as well as Third World economies. These developments contribute to enormous 
increases in productivity in many industries and create new trading opportunities. At the 
same time, they lead to more variability and unpredictability in economic life. This 
variability is a source of wealth for those who can adapt to it. Figure 1 contrasts the 
distribution of outcomes in the less variable old economy with the distribution of 
outcomes in the new world economy.  
The manifestations of the new variability are legion: rising wage inequality in 
markets favoring skilled workers in freely functioning labor markets, the large scale 
increase in merger activity, and patenting that occurred in the early 1980s at the time of 
the rising wage inequality and the growth in volatility in trade and in some financial 
markets. The world has become more open and more fluid and at the same time many 
traditional methods and organizations have become obsolete. 
        We live in an era of creative destruction. The new order grows out of the old by 
destroying the old ways of producing goods and trading. This is an era of greater risk and 
greater return. The modern welfare state even at its newly “reformed” level is maladapted 
to this new world economy because it discourages risk taking and efficient adaptation by 
providing “social insurance” to preserve the status quo at precisely the time when many 
old economic practices are no longer productive. This explains why so many of the   8
piecemeal reforms implemented in many welfare states around the world have apparently 
failed and have been associated with rising unemployment. These reforms would have 
promoted employment and reduced unemployment in a former era. In this modern era of 
change they do not go nearly far enough to make the reformed economies flexible enough 
to respond to the new and changing world economy. The world has been changing too 
fast for European politicians and policy makers keep up, and Europe will now have to run 
to keep in place. 
          An  economic  order  that  was  well adapted to the more stable and predictable 
economic environment of the 1950s and 1960s has become dysfunctional in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The problem of unemployment in Germany is 
not due solely to the fact that the cost of labor is too high, although that is a problem 
(Bertola, 2000). It is also due to the inability of the economy to adapt to change and to 
exploit the opportunities and challenges of the new economy. The opportunity cost of 
security and preservation of the status quo—whether it is the status quo technology, the 
status quo trading partner, or the status quo job—has risen greatly in recent times. 
3.  The opening up of world trade and the increased competitiveness that flows from 
it means that now, more than ever before, uniformity in the prices of traded goods 
dictates labor market outcomes. Benefits given to workers are costs to firms and must be 
paid for in terms of lower wages or less employment. Something has to give in costs 
because market prices are set internationally and, increasingly, capital markets are 
uniform around the world. Thus nonwage mandates to workers nominally paid by firms 
must be borne by the workers themselves. Higher wages achieved by unions or by 
minimum wage statutes must lead to substitution against labor—fewer jobs—if firms are 
to remain competitive. 
4.  Hallmark features of the new economy are diversity, heterogeneity of 
opportunities, and value of local knowledge. One feature of the dynamics of the new 
order is that many idiosyncratic opportunities arise as potential trading partners and 
potential production partners seek each other out. 
 The old economics focused on stable technologies where broad aggregates such 
as capital and labor were assumed to be homogeneous. The economics of the modern era 
focuses on models of matching and sorting of heterogeneous individuals into trading and   9
production units in the face of uncertainty about the suitability of any particular trading or 
production arrangement. This is a new model of the economy that features the unique and 
the relation specific. It is a model of marriage that emphasizes the value of partners that 
know each other in making the decisions to produce or trade and the value of divorce 
when circumstances change. 
It is a model of the gains to trade among idiosyncratic individuals. The new model 
emphasizes the value of local knowledge and the benefit of exploiting local knowledge 
about particular possibilities and circumstances that are not widely known. The new 
economy emphasizes that one person’s gain is not another person’s loss and that 
economic efficiency is enhanced by allowing those equipped with local knowledge to act 
on it. 
       A striking example of the benefits of local knowledge is the reform of British 
unionism. When the locus of bargaining was shifted from the national and industry level 
to the firm level, the face of British unionism changed for the better (Pencavel, 2000). 
Firms and workers in Britain are now allowed to respond to the local opportunities and 
conditions that characterize their particular situation and can more freely adapt to those 
conditions than they could when national wage setting arrangements were in place. 
National or industry bargaining diverted the attention of workers away from the 
economic realities of their own productive situation and toward the redistributive 
possibilities that flow from the application of uniform rules across diverse industrial or 
national units. Not only does the implementation of local bargaining exploit local 
information and hence promote productivity but it also inhibits the application of 
monopoly and rent seeking that occurs when bargaining units become more expansive. 
Unionism per se is not a cause of inefficiency. Rather it is monopoly unionism using its 
power to redistribute resources and divert productive activity that leads to great harm. 
  In addressing these issues, I distinguish between long- and short-run problems and 
separate long-run solutions from short-run solutions that may be of no value, or even 
harmful, in the long-run.   10
2. German Unemployment and Wages 
The facts about German unemployment are well known. Unemployment is high and has 
been rising over the past 20 years (Bertola, 2001; Bean, 1994; Nickell, 1997). Lower than 
American employment 30 years ago, it is now much higher. See Figures 2, a and b, which 
compare OECD Europe with NorthAmerican overall unemployment rates. Figure 3 
charts the temporal evolution of the German unemployment rate, which has been in the 
middle of the OECD pack. German unemployment, like most European unemployment, 
is largely made up of individuals suffering long spells. The unemployed are essentially 
removed from the labor market (see Figure 4).  American unemployment is typically of 
much shorter duration and is associated with people changing jobs as opportunities 
appear and dissolve. 
The rise in the unemployment rate in Germany is not due to an increase in 
employment or labor force participation rates. Prime age male employment rates are 
similar in the United States and in much of Europe. Overall employment rates in Europe 
and Germany are lower, a topic to which I return later. Unemployment rates are low 
among German youth (see Figure 5). 
  European unemployment is structural, not cyclical (Bertola, 2001) (see Figure 6). 
By this I mean that European—and German—employment is not amenable to the 
classical demand management policies of macroeconomics, although a few diehard 
Keynesians still push that line. The factors at work that produce higher levels of German 
unemployment are due to the economic fundamentals of incentives, technology, and 
labor supply. 
  One structural feature unique to Germany is the problem of the integration of East 
Germany. It is in fact remarkable that German unemployment rates are only in the middle 
of the European pack given the special circumstances of the East German case. Arguably, 
Germany would have one of the lower European unemployment rates were it not for the 
integration. 
  It is well documented that East German labor productivity was substantially lower 
than that in West Germany, and this difference was not due solely to differences in the 
technology between the two regimes. It is widely acknowledged that mandated wage 
parities between the regions contributed to unemployment and disemployment in the East   11
and that they still play a substantial role in inhibiting employment growth in the former 
East German regions. These parities coupled with the work disincentives in the social 
insurance system account for the 2-1 ratio of East-West unemployment rates. 
  In understanding the problems of the East, it is important to account for the 
cohort-specific nature of the problem. In the eastern regions, there are substantial 
numbers of middle age workers educated and trained to work with an obsolete 
technology who cannot adapt to the new technology. Adapting these workers to the new 
social order is prohibitively expensive, although in 1989 official German policy was 
predicated on the belief that it was easy to retrain such workers. 
  One very well-established finding from the empirical literature in economics 
(Heckman, 2000; Heckman, et al., 1999) is that publicly supported job-training programs 
for displaced adult workers are ineffective. The economics of skill investment reveal that 
it is more efficient to invest in the young and the able than to invest in the middle-aged 
and the less able, where the returns to training have consistently been shown to be 
negligible.
1 Competent empirical studies of these retraining programs for displaced 
Easterners have shown them to be failures (see Eicher and Lechner, 2000). In the short 
run, these policies reduce unemployment by making the unemployed persons trainees. In 
the long run, they are ineffective. Collecting the revenue to pay for these programs 
distorts the economy and diverts resources away from more socially useful opportunities. 
  This evidence, as well as the evidence from around the world, suggests that the 
East German problem is a cohort-specific one. A whole cohort of older workers caught 
up in the change is not well adapted to the modern technology, and training programs will 
not absorb them into the productive mainstream. Their children can be educated to be 
productive workers but they themselves cannot be. Two strategies for coping with this 
problem are: (1) to subsidize their employment and attach the workers to the economy 
with dignity by reducing the costs of these workers to firms while giving them an 
acceptable wage, or (2) to put them on the dole. Current overstated wage parities have 
forced option (2) onto the eastern Germany economy. These parities and the whole issue 
of wage subsidies should be examined carefully. 
                                                           
1 They have fewer incentives to invest in new skills because of their shorter working lives and because it 
takes skill to produce skill (Heckman, 2000).   12
In designing any such subsidies, it is necessary to make them cohort specific. 
They are a short-run solution to a short-run problem. The fathers and mothers should be 
subsidized but the children should be educated. If the children are subsidized, they will 
have no incentive to acquire skills. 
  The East German case is a dramatic example of a more general observation that 
characterizes markets in transition around the world. When new technology and 
opportunities become available, as they did in East Germany or in Argentina when it 
opened its markets to the new economy, it is the younger, more-educated, and more-able 
workers who benefit from the transition and the older, less-able, and less-educated 
workers who suffer the most. In Argentina, educated workers who would have been 
company presidents under the old regime were unemployed under the new one. The 
economic fundamentals suggest lower wages for such workers. A more humane social 
policy would pay them higher wages but subsidize firms for employing them. Economic 
policy must recognize the problem of the transition as an important feature of modern 
economies undergoing change. 
  The same forces are at work in all economies although in a less dramatic fashion. 
In the face of changes in technology and trading opportunities, it is the younger, the more 
educated, and the more able who benefit the most. The middle-aged and the older 
workers are at a disadvantage. Unless their wages adjust, they become unemployable. 
  This observation serves to explain why unemployment in Europe has increased 
across education and skill categories, especially among more experienced workers. As a 
consequence of rigidity in wages across the skill categories, these workers have become 
less employable. Economic policy should promote wage flexibility if it seeks to improve 
the employability of these workers. It should also reduce incentives to be unemployed 
from high-income replacement rates.Wage subsidies for the cohorts of workers caught up 
in the transition represent one option for improving their employment without reducing 
their standard of living (Snower, 1994; Phelps, 1997). Germans and other Europeans 
abhor the route of wage flexibility followed by the American economy, arguing that 
equity or social justice is as important, if not more important, than economic efficiency. 
  I do not want to tell Germans how to run their economy. Nor do I want to argue 
that European values placed on equality are inappropriate. However, I cannot help but   13
note that the popular emphasis on “equity” and “social justice” is usually made in a 
factual void about the true costs of redistribution, which groups are targeted for social 
justice and which groups are excluded. It is certainly true that there is less inequality in 
earnings among workers in Germany and Europe than in the United States and in other 
economies with less rigid markets (see Table 1).  At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that these statistics exclude the long-term unemployed, who constitute more 
than half of the unemployed in Germany. Accordingly, comparisons of income inequality 
between the United States and Germany exclude people with zero earnings and bias the 
comparisons, although this does not eliminate the gap in U.S.-German inequality. The 
long-term unemployed and the long-term dropouts are excluded from the accounting 
system of “social justice.” 
  Implicit in many popular discussions of income inequality is the crude belief that 
one person’s gain is another person’s loss, that is, that the economic problem is a matter 
of dividing a fixed pie. In fact, the welfare state, at the level it currently operates in 
Germany, reduces the total social pie by discouraging production. It makes the size of the 
pie for the next generation smaller than it would otherwise be by discouraging investment 
in skills, technology, and knowledge. It discourages venture capital by taxing the 
proceeds of good investments and by regulating capital markets. 
  Going back to Figure 1, we see that the welfare state reduces the dispersion of 
social outcomes by reducing the level of social outcomes. How sizable is the cost in lost 
output? This is the crucial empirical question that is never asked or answered in public 
discussions. How much of the rise in German unemployment and the slow growth in 
output is due to institutions of the welfare state? 
 
3. The Causes of Joblessness 
In order to answer the question of what causes joblessness, it is useful to review the sharp 
contrast in the institutional features of German (and European) labor and product markets 
with those of American and other less regulated markets. The familiar picture that 
emerges is that European markets are much more regulated, wage setting is much more 
centralized and less adaptable to local conditions, and the replacement rate (the 
percentage of earnings an unemployed worker can claim) is much higher in Europe than   14
in the United States.  (See Figures 7, 8, and 9, respectively). The level of payroll taxation 
is substantially higher in Europe than in the United States (see Table 2). The tax wedge 
between what a firm pays per unit labor and what the worker receives is much greater in 
Europe than in the United States. 
  A large body of evidence suggests that at the current levels of incentives, the 
German welfare state reduces employment, raises unemployment, retards flexibility and 
creates a two-tier system, with a protected enclave surrounded by a partially protected 
group of unskilled, uneducated, and marginal workers (Siebert, 1997). 
  The high level of centralized wage bargaining thwarts the ability of workers and 
firms to act on local conditions and to bargain flexibly. Pencavel (1996) documents that 
the application of three principles—(1) decentralization of bargaining to the enterprise 
level; (2) removal of government intervention from the bargaining process; (3) local 
determination of the terms over which to bargain—promotes productivity and links 
payments to productivity in the workplace and not to politics. Studies of reforms of union 
systems in Great Britain, New Zealand, and Chile reveal that application of these 
principles to previously centralized wage-setting environments promoted productivity 
and raised wages in the aggregate.
2  
Detailed econometric studies by Nickell et al. (1992), Gregg et al. (1993), and 
Machin and Stewart (1996) demonstrate that substantial productivity growth occurred 
after decentralized unionism began to govern economic relations. The issue on the table 
is not about getting rid of unions; substantial productivity gains were registered at union 
plants when decentralized unionism was introduced.  The issue is about making wage 
setting responsive to local conditions and to adapt to opportunities that appear. It has 
been shown that locally responsive unions facilitate plant-wide response to technical 
change (Levine, 1995). Decentralization improves adaptability, and the new economy 
places a premium on adaptability. 
  It is sometimes argued that centralized bargaining is beneficial and that unions 
can act in an enlightened way to correct any spillovers created by the action of local wage 
agreements. In theory, this is possible and experience with recent Dutch wage setting, 
                                                           
2 While wage inequality rose in Great Britain during this period, so did real wages, and at 
a much faster rate than in the United States.   15
until recently, illustrates that in a small country with few unions, it may be possible to 
make centralized bargaining work. However, as Pencavel demonstrates, the monopoly 
power created by centralization is too tempting not to use and the track record on 
centralized bargaining is poor, especially in large economies such as that of Germany. 
  Germany does not have a governmentally mandated minimum wage although 
union wage floors effectively operate as wage minimums. One measure of the 
effectiveness of a minimum wage is the ratio of the minimum to the average wage. This 
ratio is much higher in Germany, and continental Europe more generally, than it is in the 
United States or Great Britain (see Table 3).  The higher this ratio, the more binding these 
minimums are on the operations of firms. 
  The French ratio is below that of Germany but much higher than that of the 
United States or Great Britain. A series of important papers by John Abowd (e.g., Abowd 
et al., 1997, 1999) and various co-authors documents the substantial disemployment 
effects of French minimum wages. Minimum wage effects are weak only when minimum 
wages do not bind. A widely cited study by Card and Krueger (1995) that claimed to find 
no disemployment effects of minimum wages has been challenged in the professional 
journals. Even if correct for the small wage changes studied in the United States, this 
study is irrelevant for Europe, which has much higher effective—and binding—
minimums. Machin et al. (2000) demonstrates ho New Deal minimum-wage increases 
reduced employment in the home core sector in England 
  Some indirect evidence of the importance of the disemployment effects of the 
minimum wage is implicit in Figure 5. The lower rate of youth unemployment in 
Germany compared to that of many other countries is frequently attributed to the 
apprenticeship system. It is certainly true that a system that encourages youth to both 
work and learn promotes their immediate employment. A closer look at this system 
reveals that during the apprenticeship period, firms can pay apprentices wages that are 
substantially below the minimum wage. When the apprenticeship period ends, union-
mandated minimum wages apply. It is no accident, then, that Germany is one of the few 
countries in the world to have a higher rate of unemployment among young adults (in 
their early 20s) not covered by the minimum-wage exemption than among teenage youth   16
(Heckman et al., 1994). Reducing minimum wages substantially promotes employment in 
economies such as that of Germany, where minimum wages are high. 
  German replacement rates of the earnings of the unemployed by social insurance 
are substantial (see Figure 9). It is very well documented that higher levels of 
unemployment compensation induce greater rates of unemployment. (See the evidence 
summarized in Layard et al., 1999).  As the generosity of benefits increases, so does the 
incentive not to work. Germans, like all people, respond to these incentives.  
  German levels of labor market regulation are high compared to those in the 
United States. Employment protection laws protect the status quo and make it difficult for 
firms to respond flexibly to changing market conditions and to improved technologies. 
Thus it is no accident that the unemployment–GDP growth relationship is weak in 
Germany compared to that of countries with more flexible labor markets. Figure 10 
compares the change in the unemployment rate in response to GDP growth across a 
variety of countries. In economies where it is costly to fire workers, job growth in 
response to GDP growth is diminished since firms account for the possibility that the 
economy might turn sour in the future and employment protection laws make it difficult 
to fire redundant labor. Hence, they hire fewer workers to avoid having to pay the costs 
of possibly having to fire them. The other side of the coin, however, is that employment 
protection laws make slowdowns in GDP growth less costly in terms of unemployment. It 
protects the insiders against job loss. 
  The United States has a very flexible labor market compared to Germany. 
Nonetheless, substantial changes have recently been made to the “employment at will” 
doctrine that gave freedom to the employer to fire employees without any cost. This has 
moved the American system of severance pay closer to that of Europe. Union work rules 
impose some restrictions on U.S. firms, and the portion of the costs of unemployment 
insurance borne by the firm make work force reduction costly. 
  In the 1980s, many state judiciaries in the United States adopted “wrongful 
termination” doctrines. These doctrines impose substantial costs of employment 
termination on employers that are similar in character to severance cost payments in the 
German system. In what appears to be a natural experiment, it is possible to examine the   17
consequences of these doctrines on employment. The effectiveness and comprehensive 
nature of the law vary from state to state. 
  While the direct legal costs of the new doctrines are relatively low, on average the 
whole process adds uncertainty to the employment process and some settlements are high 
($177,000 in U.S. 1998 dollars). Firms now play a lottery with the court system. Despite 
small average costs, the response of firms to the potential of experiencing a very visible 
wrongful termination case has been dramatic. Elaborate procedures have been established 
at all stages of the hiring and discharge process. Firms now institute more elaborate 
screening and review procedures when hiring and firing workers. 
  These costs have a potent negative effect on employment in states that adopt 
“wrongful termination” laws. Dertouzos and Karoly (1991) examine the employment 
consequences of these costs. The most severe systems, which in my view are lower 
bounds for the German case, suggest that employment declines by 5 percent in states with 
the most comprehensive employment protection legislation. 
  Employment protection laws in theory need not have any adverse effects on 
employment. The argument is that if a firm were mandated to offer a benefit such as job 
security to its workers, the latter would be willing to accept lower wages to obtain the 
benefit. The composition of the pay package would be affected even if the total level of 
compensation is not. For this argument to have any practical significance, wages have to 
be downward flexible. Yet Table 3 suggests that they are not. Binding minimum wages, 
whether imposed by national laws as in France or by union minimums as in Germany, 
prevent the necessary wage adjustments. 
  Evidence of the impact of employment protection legislation on employment and 
wage inequality suggests the following. Countries with more severe employment 
regulation legislation have lower employment rates (Figure 11) and less wage inequality 
among workers (Figure 12). Those who keep jobs stay at them longer (Figure 13). There 
is little effect of this legislation on the employment of prime age males (Figure 14).  
  The picture that emerges from this evidence is that the employment protection 
laws (EPL) create a protected enclave of insiders who experience less unemployment and 
wage fluctuations than the excluded outsiders. Social justice applies to this enclave but 
not to the entire society. Given that the long-term unemployed are excluded from the   18
statistics on income inequality, international comparisons of income inequality such as 
those in Table 1 dramatically understate the inequality inherent in the European welfare 
state.   19
4. Restrictions in Other Markets 
When considering Germany’s employment problems, the natural first impulse is to look 
at the institutions governing the labor market. Yet economists since the time of Alfred 
Marshall have recognized that the structure of the product and the capital markets affect 
the performance of the labor market. 
  The German product market is highly regulated, although it is far from the most 
regulated product market in Europe (see Figure 15). Product market regulation goes hand 
in glove with labor market regulation (see Figure 16) (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2001; 
Scarpetta, 1998). Inducing competition in the product market is one way of curbing 
excess union power. Price-taking firms offer smaller opportunities for rent seeking 
unions.  
  Regulation of the product market retards the responsiveness of the German 
economy to new trade and technology opportunities and inhibits job creation (Djankov et 
al., 2000). Table 4 compares the regulatory environment in Germany with that of the rest 
of the world. Compared to the United States, German firms are required to go through 
more procedures (seven vs. four) and take a longer time (90 vs. 7 days), and the process 
costs roughly ten times more in Germany than in the United States. By inhibiting entry 
and retarding flexibility, product market regulation reduces the demand for labor and the 
growth of jobs. This unfriendly regulatory environment also retards investment and risk 
taking. It inhibits German adaptation to the new economy. As an example, consider the 
relationship between Internet usage and EPL (see Figure 17). The more stringent the 
employment protection or business regulation laws, the less the use of the Internet (see 
Samaniego, 2001), which accounts for the lesser use of the Internet in Germany (see 
figure 18). 
  This unfriendly environment also helps to explain why, in recent years, the share 
of foreign direct investment in Germany has been so low (see Figure 19) and why 
German investment in venture capital is low (see Figure 20).  It also accounts for why 
Germans have found investment abroad so attractive. 
  Reforms in the product market and in capital markets will promote flexibility and 
will facilitate reforms in the labor market. That is a lesson learned during many 
successful economic reforms around the world.   20
 
5. The Long-Run Consequences of Regulation and the Welfare State for Germany 
Product market and labor market regulation not only impede the flexibility of the German 
economy but also threaten its future vitality. These long-run effects are rarely debated in 
public because they operate in a subtle fashion and do not show up on the front pages of 
newspapers. 
  Trade is the engine of German economic power. Germany retains its strong 
competitive position in medium-high technology (e.g., traditional manufacturing). But it 
does not have comparative advantage in the cutting edge technologies of computers, 
information technology, and biotechnology (see Figure 21). The technology intensity of 
German exports is low by international standards (see Figure 22). The highly regulated 
capital markets have prevented German venture capital from flowing into these cutting-
edge areas of world trade and technology (Siebert and Stolpe, 2001). As a consequence, 
German supremacy in trade in future world markets is at risk. 
  The high tax rates inherent in the German system and the rigidity of the 
educational system discourage skill formation. Since knowledge is created by educated 
people, the failure of German institutions of higher learning to produce more students and 
to develop flexible arrangements with industry bodes ill for the future of German 
technology. 
 
6. Summing Up 
The Germany economy labors under the burden of heavy regulation and weak incentives. 
The German welfare state has succeeded in raising the wages and benefits of protected 
insiders but at the cost of low employment growth, low productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector, and higher unit labor costs (see Figures 24, 25, 26). These factors 
threaten the long-term competitive position of German industry in world trade and inhibit 
Germany from investing in the technologies of the future. 
  In analyzing German employment problems, I have stressed the importance of 
distinguishing long-run from short-run problems and long-run from short-run solutions. 
German unemployment is a structural problem. Some aspects of German unemployment 
will fade as older cohorts of workers trained under the East German system retire and are   21
replaced by more educated workers adapted to the new system. Apart from this short-run 
feature a substantial portion of German unemployment is a symptom of the deeper 
problem that incentives to innovate, to acquire skills, and to take risks have been thwarted 
by the welfare state. The costs of preserving the status quo have increased in the new 
world economy that is characterized by many new opportunities in technology and trade. 
The winners in world trade in the next generation will be those countries that can respond 
flexibly with educated work forces. 
  I opened this chapter with a quotation from Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks. In 
closing, let me explain its relevance. The German economy is, in many ways, still in 
robust health. Germany remains a major factor in the world economy. Germans have 
begun to shift toward making markets more flexible, unemployment benefits lower, and 
bargaining more decentralized. These reforms have only been partial in character and are 
not substantial enough to successfully adapt the German economy to the economy of the 
future. 
  In pursuit of social justice—which in actuality is a defense of a protected enclave 
of workers and firms—Germany has muted incentives to invest in ideas, skills, and new 
technology. These muted incentives portend a second-rate German economy in the 
future. While Germany is not yet Thomas Mann’s dead star, sending forth its light, it will 
be a dying star if it fails to adapt to the new world economic order.   22
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Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2000.
































Source: OECD, Employment Outlook  2000.
a) Ratio refers to unemployed persons aged 15 to 24 years divided by the labour force of the same age group.
%7
Structural and cyclical components of unemployment rates1
Per cent of total labour force
1. Based on national unemployment definitions. Structural unemployment data are based on Secretariat estimates of the
    non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU) made for the OECD Economic Outlook, 60, 1996.
Source: OECD.
Change 1990-97






























































































































































































































































Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 1999.
a) The scores can range from 0 to 6, with higher values respresenting stricter regulationthe German labor force in 1995, but labor-management con -
tracts set the wages for 92 percent of the employees. Except in
Switzerland and the United Kingdom, collective bargaining
contracts set the wages for two-thirds or more of the employ -
ees throughout Europe in the mid-1990s.
In contrast with Europe, the United States, Canada, and
Japan are characterized by decentralized collective bargaining.
Unionized wage contracts in these countries reflect bargaining
between a union and a single employer, or in some cases, a
single plant of the employer. Those contracts do not apply to
other firms. Under these circumstances, the union density fig -
nonunion employees and nonassociation employers who nei -
ther participated in the bargaining process nor agreed to wage
contracts. Sometimes political officials also are actively
involved in the wage-setting process. 
The r efore, as the data of Chart 1 high li ght, the percentage of
workers whose wages are set by collective bargaining is often
substantially gr e ater than the union density rate. For e x ample,
in France, where only 9 percent of the nonfarm labor force was
unionized in 1995, contracts between unions and employer
assoc i ations set the wages for 95 percent of French employees.
Similarly, unionized workers constituted only 29 percent of
42
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Figure 8 Percent of Employees Whose Wages Are Set by Collective Bargaining
Contracts: 1980 and 1995
Source: OECD,  Employment Outlook, July 1994 (Table 5.7), OECD  Employment Outlook , July
1997 (Table 3.3), and OECD,  Country Surveys (various years),training, public sector employment, subsidized employment,
and subsidized early retirement. Those programs are often
lumped together under the heading of Active Labor Market
Policies (ALMPs). Various inducements, including income
supplements and renewed eligibility for other transfer benefits,
make the programs attractive for participants. Expenditures on
programs of this type are larger in Europe, particularly north -
ern Europe, than in Japan and the United States. Even though
there is little evidence that ALMPs permanently reduce unem -
ployment, they will influence the “measured” rate. Because
persons involved in training programs are not looking for
work, they are not counted among the unemployed. Persons
induced into early retirement are moved out of the labor force.
Subsidized private employment and sheltered government
employment not only reduce the observed rate of unemploy -
ment, they also add to the number counted as employed.
Differences in the enforcement of eligibility criteria and the
contribute to the complexity of empirical work in this area. 
The Distortion of Employment Statistics . Labor market regu -
lations are complex and their impact is often subtle. The diffi -
culties are compounded by the fact that seemingly similar poli -
cies and programs are sometimes enforced differently across
countries and at different times within the same country. For
example, countries differ with regard to work registration
requirements for unemployment benefits, and the differences
influence the number of persons who are counted as unem -
ployed. Countries such as Belgium permit part-time workers to
draw unemployment benefits, thereby confounding the measure
of unemployment. Countries also have a variety of retirement,
invalidity, and sickness programs that further complicate the
matter. These differences between countries reduce the compa -
rability of even the standardized data on rates of unemployment. 
Furthermore, in response to high rates of unemployment,
several OECD countries have adopted programs involving
46
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Figure 9 The Net Initial Replacement Rate for an Unemployed Married
Worker with Two Children: 1995
Source: OECD,  Job Strategy: Making Working Pay , 1997 (Table 9) and OECD,
Database on Taxation and Benefit Entitlements . These data are for a 40-year-
old worker (with spouse and two children) employed continuously since age 18.
Net Replacement Rate (% of Income)
(Including Housing Benefits)21
Yet, the degree of unionisation is not  per se sufficient to identify workers ’  market power.  In many
countries, the administrative extension of wage agreements means that the terms and conditions of
union contracts often cover workers who are not union members.  By the same token, high union power
in one sector can lead to spillover effects in non-union sectors.
Table 2  Tax wedge and social security contributions  
(in percent of gross wages). (Source: Scarpetta, S., 1998)
Total tax wedge Employers’  social security
contribution rate
1985 1994 1985 1994
Australia 22,9 23,5 0,0 0,0
Austria 40,3 39,7 18,6 19,1
Belgium 54,2 53,5 28,8 25,8
Canada 26,9 31,4 4,7 6,2
Denmark 47,8 45,2 2,8 0,0
Finland 38,0 39,4 5,7 3,6
France 43,4 43,6 27,5 26,2
Germany 44,5 48,3 14,5 16,3
Greece 31,4 .. 17,9 21,6
Iceland 16,5 22,9 2,1 2,8
Ireland 42,4 38,4 10,9 10,9
Italy 50,0 49,9 29,9 31,5
Japan 21,6 21,6 6,8 7,0
Luxembourg 38,4 35,1 13,3 13,0
Mexico .. 26,5 15,2 16,2
Netherlands 49,9 45,6 19,2 7,3
New Zealand 27,9 24,3 0,0 0,0
Norway 41,8 36,9 13,5 11,3
Portugal 30,7 34,3 16,7 19,7
Spain 36,6 38,8 23,8 24,0
Sweden 50,9 46,8 24,0 23,2
Switzerland 28,8 28,7 9,4 9,3
Turkey 37,0 35,7 8,3 6,7
United Kingdom 37,8 33,3 9,5 9,3
United States 33,6 31,2 6,6 7,1
1.  Total tax wedges include income taxes, employer and employee social security
contributions, but not indirect taxes.  Tax rates refer to one earner without dependents
and take into account standard tax relief.
Source:  OECD, Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers (various issues).
The degree of centralisation of wage bargaining is an important characteristic of industrial relations.  A
highly centralised wage bargaining system may allow the economy to respond in a more consistent way
to adverse shocks than decentralised systems in which different groups/sectors/companies negotiate
separately over wages (Tarantelli, 1986; Bruno and Sachs, 1985).  However, Calmfors and Driffill
(1988) have stressed that the relationship between centralisation of wage bargaining and wage
outcomes is not linear, but rather  hump-shaped
15.  This implies that both highly centralised (co-
operative) bargaining structures -- such as those in Austria and the Nordic countries  -- and fully
decentralised (competitive) structures (United States) offer the best results.  In an intermediate
                                                  
15.  However, the hump -shaped hypothesis has also been criticised.  See in particular  Soskice (1990) and the OECD
(1997c).Ta b l e 3.
Minimum to Average Wage in Latin America
and the Industrialized Countries
Bo livia (1995)  0.21 Columbia 95 0.54
Br azil (1995)   0.24 Costa Rica 9 5 0 .54
Arg e nt i n a 95 0. 2 6 De n ma rk 94 0 . 54
Chile 94 0.30 Germany 91 0.55
Spain 0.32 Ireland 93 0.55
Mexico 94 0.36 Netherlands 0.55
Peru 96 0.36 Luxembourg 0.56
USA 93 0.39 Belgium 92 0.60
UK 93 0.40 Honduras 96 0.61
Panama 95 0.43 Austria 93 0.62
Portugal 0.45 Greece 95 0.62
France 0.50 Paraguay 95 0.64
Finland 93 0.52 El Salvador 95 0.69
Sweden 0.52 Italy 91 0.71
Switzerkand 0.52 Venezuela 0.88
Source: LAC countries; authors’ calculations based on
household surveys. Industrial countries; Dolado et al. (1996)Figure 10  Unemployment Response to GDP Growth
















Change in unemployment rate
Note:  * or ** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 5 or 1 percent level, respectively.  Only countries for which unemployment data 
is available for at least 10 years are included.
Source:  Economic and Social Progress in Latin America:  1996 Report.  Special Section:   Making Social Services Work.  The Inter-
American Development Bank.  Washington, D.C.:  Johns Hopkins University Press.  1996.19
4.1. Policy responses to unemployment
Why does high unemployment persist when it is not only unpleasant for the individuals concerned, but
also decried by unions, politicians, and public opinion? One might entertain the possibility that simple
theoretical mechanisms such as those outlined above are not well understood by those who draft laws
and set wages, so that unemployment is evil in the eyes of the same agents who (directly or indirectly,
individually or collectively) are responsible for it. If this were the case, more economics education—or
perhaps granting exceptional reform powers to a well-trained economist—could suffice to resolve all
problems. It is more satisfactory, of course, to maintain that rational agents understand the economy’s
mechanisms as well as, or even better than, we do. One may then be tempted to argue that
unemployment, if it exists and persists, presumably is more palatable to a political majority than possible
alternatives. Eliminating unemployment subsidies, for example, could very well eliminate
unemployment, but only at the cost of increases in poverty and possibly crime rates. Like Dr.Pangloss,
one might be tempted to conclude that, in the best of possible worlds, unemployment can hardly be a
problem, at least not a problem that can ever be solved.
A realistic and constructive approach to unemployment should of course be intermediate
between these two extremes. While reducing unemployment cannot be easy, it does not necessarily
follow that the current configuration of any given labor market is the best possible one. Institutional
features do need to be reformed when  their negative effects (possibly unintended, or amplified by
exogenous structural changes) offset or overwhelm their intended purpose.
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would need to bid for the insiders’ jobs on a present discounted (rather than period-by-period) basis,
and minimum wage constraints can prevent such bidding.
4 Labor market institutions and outcomes
Wage inequality statistics, like wage level statistics, are not readily comparable across countries. Low
variability of wages across jobs may be due to compression and truncation, and result in involuntary
unemployment for relatively less productive workers, but it may also reflect relative homogeneity of the
labor force in terms of education and skill levels. Such sources of wage inequality, however, are
relatively similar across industrialized countries:  Devroye and Freeman (2001) find that differences in
the distribution of skills explain only about 7% of cross-country wage inequality indicators. Available
data on the difference between the 5th and 1st decile of male earnings, plotted in Figure 7, indicate that
high job-security countries also tend to display relatively less dispersed wage distribution. This is far
from surprising if EPL and other labor-market regulations aim at protecting workers from (uninsurable)
labor-income fluctuations. Clearly, restrictions on employers’ ability to dismiss redundant worker at will
would offer little such protection if wages were left free to vary over time (and across labor market
segments) in response to labor demand fluctuations. Conversely, limits to wage flexibility would give
employers stronger incentives to hire and fire in response to labor demand fluctuations and, if such
hiring and firing were not constrained by EPL, would result in more unstable labor income patterns for
workers facing job-switching costs. 
Thus, EPL and wage compressions may be viewed as the quantity and price components of a
coherent policy package which, while reducing the productive efficiency of the economy, can be
attractive to workers exposed to uninsurable labor income risk. The measures of tenure length and
earnings volatility considered in Figure 8 offer additional support to the notion that that work experiences
and labor incomes are more stable and “protected” in countries with high EPL – which is in turn rather
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tightly negatively associated with earnings inequality in Figure 7, and may therefore be viewed as a
summary indicator of labor market regulation on both the price and quantity margins. Not only does
high EPL effectively protect workers from frequent turnover, lengthening average tenure length; it is
also empirically associated with high correlation of earnings for workers who are employed in both of
the beginning and end of a five-year period, and with relatively small mobility across the distribution of
earnings, measured as the average number of quintiles changes over the same 5-year period.
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problems. It is more satisfactory, of course, to maintain that rational agents understand the economy’s
mechanisms as well as, or even better than, we do. One may then be tempted to argue that
unemployment, if it exists and persists, presumably is more palatable to a political majority than possible
alternatives. Eliminating unemployment subsidies, for example, could very well eliminate
unemployment, but only at the cost of increases in poverty and possibly crime rates. Like Dr.Pangloss,
one might be tempted to conclude that, in the best of possible worlds, unemployment can hardly be a
problem, at least not a problem that can ever be solved.
A realistic and constructive approach to unemployment should of course be intermediate
between these two extremes. While reducing unemployment cannot be easy, it does not necessarily
follow that the current configuration of any given labor market is the best possible one. Institutional
features do need to be reformed when their negative effects (possibly unintended, or amplified by
exogenous structural changes) offset or overwhelm their intended purpose.
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1.  Factor analysis applied to summary indicators of state control, barriers to entrepreneurial activity and barriers to trade and 
     investment.
Figure 3. Overall indicator of product market regulation
1




























Dynamic regulatory reform indicators
39. Reconstructing past developments in product market regulation is a difficult task for many
reasons. First, national administrations have a short memory when it comes to changes in regulation:
turnover of civil servants and incomplete and unsystematic reporting of past regulatory activity make it
impractical to collect information from national sources alone. Second, regulatory reform is a relatively
recent phenomenon: the more back in time one goes, the less attention to product market regulation one
finds in the press and in specialised publications. Third, published professional or academic sources often
follow the fashion of the day, concentrating on specific industries (e.g. telecoms) and regulatory areas (e.g.
public ownership), but rarely on a continuous basis. These problems are compounded when information on
past regulatory developments is sought for a large set of countries. As a result, the available data are often
scattered and incomplete, and refer to a set of industries that does not necessarily cover a large share of the
economy.
40. The data used in this paper covers regulations and market conditions in seven energy and service
industries over the 1970-1998 period: gas, electricity, post, telecoms (mobile and fixed services), passenger
air transport, railways (passenger and freight services) and road freight. The coverage of regulatory areas
varies across industries. Regulatory barriers to entry are reported for all industries; public ownership is
reported in all industries except road freight; vertical integration is documented for gas, electricity and
railways; market structure is documented for gas, telecommunications and railways; and price controls are
reported for road freight. Time-series information on regulatory and market developments was drawn from
five main sources:
−   the OECD: Regulatory Reform, Privatisation and Competition Policy (1992); OECD
Roundtables on competition and regulation, various issues; The OECD International
Regulation Database; OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, various issues;
−   the  European Conference of Ministers of Transportation: Rail Restructuring in Europe, 1998;
Regulatory Reforms in the Transport Sector, 1987; Ompetition Policy and Deregulation of
Road Transport, 1990; Railway Reform, 2001;
−   the World Bank: Industry Structure and Regulation in Infrastructure: a Cross-Country
Survey, 1996;19
1. The scale of indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive









































44. To clarify further the relationship between product market regulations and EPL, we used cluster
analysis to identify groups of countries that share common patterns across the two sets of regulations. The
analysis was performed using as basic data the three summary indicators of product market regulations --
state control, barriers to entrepreneurial activity, and barriers to international trade and investment --
together with the two summary indicators of EPL for regular and for temporary employment.  We
identified three main country clusters:
−   The first cluster includes common-law countries (the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand). They are characterised by a relatively liberal
approach in both the labour and product markets.
−   The second cluster includes most continental European countries and Japan. They share relatively
restrictive product market regulations. This group can be further split in two sub-groups
according to the EPL stance: Denmark and Switzerland being less restrictive than Germany,




;	#           		& (higher= better)
     # Procedures       Days to get     Cost/GDP  Rule of Law Anti-Director  Creditor
        required          Approval         Per Capita Rights    Rights
Australia  3    3 .0209 10 4 1
Austria  12 154              .4545 10 2 3
Belgium  8 42 .1001 10 0 2
Canada  2  2 .0140 10 4 1
Denmark  5 21 .0136 10 3 3
Finland  4 32 .0199 10 2 1
France 16 66 .1970 8.98 2 0
Germany  7 90 .0851 9.23 1 3
Greece 13 53 .4799 6.18 1 1
Ireland  4 25 .1145 7.80 3 1
Italy 11 121 .2474 8.33 0 2
Japan 11 50 .1144 8.98 3 2
Neth  8 77 .3031 10 2 2
N Zealand  3 17 .0042 10 4 3
Norway 6 24 .0249 10 3 2
Portugal 12 99 .3129 8.68 2 1
Spain 11 83 .1269 7.80 2 2
Sweden   4 17 .0254 10 2 2
Switzerland       12  88  .1336  10  1  1
United Kingdon    7  11  .0056  8.57  4  4
United States        4   7              .0096  10  5  1
Source: Djankov, Simeon; La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei,
“The Regulation of Entry”, NBER Working Paper 7892 September 2000; La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation” NBER Working Paper 7403, October 1999
La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, “Legal Determinants of External Finance” NBER Working
Paper 5879, January 1997
a)  table III,  number of procedures = sum of safety & health, environment, taxes,
labor, screening,; time = estimated days before firm can start operation;  cost = time and direct cost of
meeting requirements as fraction of GDP per capita in 1997
b) Rule of Law, based on International Country Risk Guide
    Anti-Director Rights, index that measures shareholder rights, range from 0 to 5.
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1. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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1. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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1.  GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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Figure 19  (cont.) Foreign Direct Investment
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1. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation
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1. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation




















































































Investment in venture capital
as a percentage of GDP
1997
Average annual growth rate of investment
in venture capital, 1995-97
Canada Austria
Source: OECD, based on data from European Venture Capital Association; MITI (Japan); CVCA (Canada); NVCA (United States).
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Figure 20 Venture capital
Investment in venture capital
as a percentage of GDP
1997
Average annual growth rate of investment
in venture capital, 1995-97
Canada Austria
Source: OECD, based on data from European Venture Capital Association; MITI (Japan); CVCA (Canada); NVCA (United States).
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Investment in venture capital
as a percentage of GDP
1997
Average annual growth rate of investment
in venture capital, 1995-97
Canada Austria
Source: OECD, based on data from European Venture Capital Association; MITI (Japan); CVCA (Canada); NVCA (United States).
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OECD 1999
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Source: OECD.
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nProductivity and Unit Labour Costs
 87
OECD 1999
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Relative trade-weighted unit labour costs by industry, 1996
1990 = 100, US dollar basis
Source: OECD, STAN and Bilateral Trade databases, May 1999.
Total manufacturing (ISIC 3)
Japan
Textiles, footwear and leather (ISIC 32)
Basic metal industries (ISIC 37)
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1990 = 100, US dollar basis
Source: OECD, STAN and Bilateral Trade databases, May 1999.
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Figure 24 Unit labour costs
Relative trade-weighted unit labour costs by industry, 1996
1990 = 100, US dollar basis
Source: OECD, STAN and Bilateral Trade databases, May 1999.
Total manufacturing (ISIC 3)
Japan
Textiles, footwear and leather (ISIC 32)
Basic metal industries (ISIC 37)
Food, beverages and tobacco (ISIC  31)
Chemical products (ISIC 35)












































































































Real Total Compensation per Employee 
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Employment, 1997









dLabor costs for production workers.  Hourly direct pay includes pay 
for time worked, pay for time not worked, bonuses, and the cost of any
payments in kind.  Hourly indirect pay includes employer expenditures
for legally required insurance programs and contractual and private
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